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Abstract
In most fisheries worldwide, crew are paid through different shared remuneration
systems rather than a fixed wage. In shared remuneration systems, wages can
significantly increase when the economic performance of vessels improve, and
consequently provide incentives to workers. However, in recent years, mainly due
to high overexploitation levels that lead to reduced productivity and consequently
lower salaries shared remuneration systems have lost their attractiveness. Different
remuneration systems applied in fisheries world-wide are described and analyzed
comparatively. Results explain how crew wages and rent distribution outcomes vary
between the different remuneration systems depending on the state of exploitation
of the resource.
Introduction
The fishing sector is an important economic sector, source of wealth, food supply and
nutrition security (McClanahan et al. 2013; Hall et al. 2013). In 2012, capture fisheries
produced 91.3 million tons of fish, and 66.6 million tons of fish were obtained from
aquaculture (FAO 2014a). Of these 158 million tons, 136.2 million tons were used for
human consumption, which is equivalent to an average consumption of 19.2 kg of fish
per capita. Around 58.3 million people were engaged in the primary sector of capture
fisheries and aquaculture in 2012 (FAO 2014a). Of these, about 40 million were
engaged in capture fisheries.
Many economic activities worldwide remunerate their workers using time based
remunerations: fixed wages (monthly salaries) or hourly or daily rates (Schloss 1898;
Kessler 2009). Additionally, in some remuneration systems workers’ salary is complemen-
ted with incentives, by relating the wage to the worker’s output (i.e., piece rate, task
wage), using a combination of time and output remunerations or bonus and commission
systems (Schloss 1898; Lazear 1986; Kessler 2009). Many of these remuneration systems
were developed following the needs of the industrial sector (Schloss 1898).
In the agricultural and fishing sectors incentives play a more important role. In the
agriculture sector sharecropping contracts are almost universal throughout the world,
where the tenant pays a specific proportion of the produce or of the gross sales to the
landlord (Johnson 1950; Stiglitz 1974; Reid 1976; Newbery 1977; Allen 1985).
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In the fishing sector, remuneration systems based on productivity prevail, conse-
quently providing incentives for the crew to increase production. Crew are usually re-
munerated through shared remuneration systems (also known as lay systems) rather
than fixed wages (i.e., Zoeteweij 1956; Acheson 1981; Anderson 1982; Platteau and
Nugent 1992; Matthiasson 1997; McConnell and Price 2006). In these remuneration
systems, crew members are paid with a share of the revenues (i.e., value of landings) or
a share of the revenues minus costs.
This practice of paying the crew with shared remuneration systems is applied to both
small scale and industrial fisheries, as well as in developed and developing countries.
Indeed, it is extensive to fisheries worldwide as can be seen from Table 1:
Table 1 Existing references on the use of shared remuneration systems
Continent Country Reference
Africa Ghana Christensen 1977
Morocco Malouli Idrissi et al. 2003
Kamili 2006
Senegal Tietze et al. 2001
Tunisia Azabou et al. 1989
America Brazil Giasson 1981
Canada Breton 1973
Chile Salazar 2015
Ecuador Middleton 1977
Barbados Tietze et al. 2001
French Guyana Béné 1996
Guadeloupe Guyader et al. 2013
Mexico McGoodwin 1976
United States McConnell and Price 2006
Abbott et al. 2010
Asia India Bavinck 2001
Republic of Korea Tietze et al. 2001
Philippines Smith et al. 1983
Sri Lanka Alexander 1977
Thailand ILO 2013
Turkey Ünal 2002
Vietnam Thuy et al. 2013
Europe France Guillen et al. 2015
Iceland Matthiasson 1997
Italy Colloca et al. 2003
Spain Lleonart, et al. 1999, 2003
Maynou et al. 2006
Prellezo and Iriondo 2016
Sweden Lofgren 1972
United Kingdom Hatcher 2010
McCall Howard 2012
Oceania Australia George and New 2013
Skirtun, Stephan and Mazur 2014
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Shared remuneration systems have traditionally been used in fisheries because they
improve productivity (Weitzman and Kruse 1990). This is because shared remuneration
systems share risks (costs) and rents (profits) between the crew and the vessel owner
(Stiglitz 1974; Sutinen 1979; Acheson 1981; Plourde and Smith 1989; McGoodwin
1991), and provide incentives based on outputs in situations where monitoring of
worker’s effort is unobservable or costly (Stiglitz 1974; Eisenhardt 1989; McConnell and
Price 2006; Vestergaard 2010).
Moreover, in addition to the principal-agent problem where captains may have incen-
tives to apply a different fishing effort depending if they are the owners of the vessels
or not, in order to maximize their personal income (Eisenhardt 1989; Vestergaard
2010); the use of different remuneration systems leads to different fishing efforts in
order to achieve the management objectives independently of the presence of the vessel
owner (Guillen et al. 2015).
Shared remuneration systems allow the crew to obtain higher wages by capturing
part of the fisheries rent when the economic performance of the vessel improves
(Griffin et al. 1976), in part due to the crew work. Fisheries rent is a “surplus”
from the exploitation of fisheries resources. It is estimated as the difference be-
tween total revenues obtained from the fishery and the total costs (estimated at
their opportunity costs) of employing the various factors of production (including
charges for replacement of assets) that together make up the firms participating in
the fishery (Guillen et al. 2015).
Therefore, fisheries rent is divided between owners (capital) rent and labor rent.
Being the owners rent the extra current profits (above the opportunity cost of cap-
ital); while labor rent is estimated as the difference between current wages and the
opportunity cost of labor. This can act as an incentive to improve the attractive-
ness of the fishing sector on the labor market because it is an activity where the
strenuousness of work onboard limits the labor supply, as well as an incentive to
increase the labor time and effort.
However, there are important variations in the shared remuneration systems used
worldwide. Main differences between shared remuneration systems depend on which
costs are deducted from the crew part. Moreover, when crew are paid through shared
remuneration systems, the sharing within crew members is often not homogeneous,
highlighting differences in marginal productivity and payment of labor quasi rents.
The Sunken billions report (Willmann et al. 2008) estimates labor costs in global fish-
eries to be between 30 and 50% of total costs. Labor costs represent on average about
35% of the total EU fishing fleets costs (STECF 2012). While, Jin et al. (2002) estimate
that labour costs represent 30 to 60% of total costs (including fixed costs) for the New
England groundfish fleet. Labor costs constitute an important part of the fishing costs
and consequently have a significant impact on the economic performance and strat-
egies of the different fleets. It is, therefore, important to understand how labor costs
rise and labor rent is created.
Fisheries management measures have a direct impact on the creation of fisheries (or
resource) rent (see, for instance, Guillen et al. 2013); while the remuneration systems
have a direct impact on the fisheries rent distribution between the vessel owner and
the crew. In shared remuneration systems, therefore, fisheries management measures
have also an impact on labor costs and crew wages.
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Most countries manage their fisheries to achieve a combination of biologic, eco-
nomic, social, and political objectives (Mardle et al. 2002; Hilborn 2007; Dichmont et
al. 2010). However, management objectives are often conflicting and it is not possible
to achieve all of them at the same time.
 As a biological objective, Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) is interpreted as
the maximum long term average catch that can be achieved under prevailing
conditions, including both the state of the ecosystem and size selectivity of the
fishery (ICES 2010). Thus, the target of fisheries operating at MSY meets both
biological sustainability and production maximization objectives (Beverton and
Holt 1957; Hilborn and Stokes 2010). Hence, under this management objective,
often revenues are maximized1 but not profits. However, in this study, it is
assumed that price is related to the fish biomass at sea, following Willmann et
al. (2008). Consequently, the fishing effort level that maximizes production
(catches) is not the same one that maximizes revenues.
 As an economic objective, Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) can be defined as the
sustainable catch that maximizes the difference between total revenues and total
costs of fishing (Huntsman 1951; Gordon 1954; Kompas 2005). So, the MEY should
correspond to the catch of an optimally managed fishery aiming at maximizing the
rents extracted from the fishery. Therefore, differentiating between maximizing
rents (profits and labor rents) which strictly corresponds to MEY, and maximizing
only profits.
 As a social objective, the maximum employment target can be defined, following Pilling
et al. (2008), as the maximum effort, and consequently employment, in a non-
loss making fishery. So this management objective corresponds to the bio-economic
equilibrium or open access point. In an open access fishery, the bio-economic
equilibrium is given at an effort level where profit is zero and total fishing cost
is equal to total revenue (Hannesson 1993).
The objective of this study is to explore the effects and see the divergences of differ-
ent remuneration systems by estimating the evolution of crew wages and the distribu-
tion of rents between labor and capital (the vessel owner) at several fisheries
management targets. Here, the management objectives analyzed are maximum produc-
tion (MSY), maximum revenues, maximum rents (MEY), maximum profits and max-
imum employment or bio-economic equilibrium compared to the status quo (when
current fishing effort remains constant) for the global marine fisheries.
Methodology
Compilation of fisheries remuneration systems used world-wide
There are important variations in the shared remuneration systems used worldwide.
One of the main variations in shared remuneration systems is on the extent to
which crew participates in paying the costs (Zoeteweij 1956). From a literature re-
view, we identified 4 remuneration systems commonly used in fisheries: (i) fixed
remuneration systems (case 1), (ii) shared remuneration system: proportional to
catch or revenues (case 2), (iii) shared remuneration system: proportional to
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revenues minus operational costs (case 3) and (iv) shared remuneration system:
proportional to profits (case 4).
However, sometimes fishermen’s remuneration include items of several of these groups;
for example: (i) in the small-scale purse seiners in Vietnam crew can be paid with a fixed
wage (case 1) and a small bonus based on a share of the revenues (case 2) (Thuy et al.
2013); (ii) in the trawler fleet in Mediterranean Spain the main remuneration system is a
share of the revenues minus operational costs (case 3), but crew also receive a small part
of the landings (morralla, composed of species with low value2) (case 2) (Lleonart et al.
1999, 2003; Alemany and Álvarez 2003; Maynou et al. 2006; Samy-Kamal et al. 2014).
It is also possible that in a fishery different remuneration systems coexist, as shown
in (i) Ünal (2002) where 67% of the trawl vessels in Turkey used a fixed wage (case 1)
and 33% a share system (case 3); (ii) Thuy et al. (2013) for the small-scale purse seiners
in Vietnam that used a fixed wage with a small bonus based on a share of the revenues
(cases 1 and 2) or a share remuneration of the revenues minus the variable costs (case
3); and (iii) fishers in Thailand receive a remuneration proportional to the sale of the
catch3 in 41.3% of the cases, a fix wage plus a proportion of the catch (38.9%), or a fix
wage only (10.4%) (ILO 2013). Moreover, in recent years, together with the difficulties
for vessel owners to find crew in certain fisheries, crew is asking to be paid with fixed
wages rather than shared remuneration systems.
It should also be noted that due to the little attention paid to the remuneration sys-
tems used in fisheries, these systems are often not specified in detail and their function-
ing oversimplified. For example, this oversimplification can lead to the literature stating
that fisheries operate through shared remuneration systems proportional to the catch
(case 2); when in fact the same fisheries are actually remunerated through shared remu-
neration systems proportional to the revenues minus the operational costs (case 3).
Case 1: fixed remuneration system
In a fixed remuneration system, crew are paid with a constant (fixed) wage, either daily,
monthly or at another time-scale. Examples of this system include:
 The US Chesapeake Bay blue crab fishery uses a pure (fix) wage system in
approximately 40% of the trips (McConnell and Price 2006);
 The US factory trawlers in the Bering Sea harvesting and processing groundfish
remunerate the processing crew and engineers primarily via a (fix) daily wage
(McConnell and Price 2006);
 67% of the trawl vessels in Turkey (Ünal 2002);
 Some small-scale purse seiners in Vietnam remunerate the crew with a daily fixed
wage of about 30 to 40 thousand Vietnamese Dong (case 1), complemented with
10% of the total revenues shared between the crew (case 2) (Thuy et al. 2013);
 The industrial fleet of Saint-Malo (France) remunerates crew with a fixed wage to
guarantee the crew a minimum wage and a shared wage to act as an incentive.
Case 2: shared remuneration system (proportional to catch or revenues)
Zoeteweij (1956) points out that the income of fishermen is more often determined by
the value of the catch rather than its size. Indeed, in those fisheries where no costs are
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deducted from the revenues before compensating the crew, the remuneration is often
proportional to the revenues and not the catch. A remuneration proportional to the
catches only matches with remuneration proportional to the revenues when there is
only one species or several species with the same price. The distinction between share
of catches and revenues is relevant because it is possible to catch different species or
sizes with different prices at the same time (i.e. a large amount of low valued species
and just few of high valued ones), so both outcomes would be different. Some examples
of fisheries using shared remuneration systems proportional to revenues are:
 The US factory trawlers in the Bering Sea harvesting and processing groundfish
remunerate their harvesting crews with a share of the revenues (typically 30–35%
in aggregate) (McConnell and Price 2006).
 In the French Guyana shrimp fishery remuneration is compounded by a share of
the catch, and a bonus that provides incentives to the crew to target large shrimps
during periods of high resource levels and smaller shrimps during months of lower
catch levels (Béné 1996).
 Icelandic vessels remunerate their crew with a share of the revenues without
considering the costs (Matthiasson 1997).
 In the artisanal fishery of Cilento (Italy), crew members receive about 50% of the
revenues, and any fish that have not been sold because of damage or no
commercial value (Colloca et al. 2003).
 In the Basque (North West of Spain) traditional purse seiner-live bait fleet, which
fish small pelagics using purse seiners and big pelagics (tuna) using live bait with
hooks, the crew receive 50% of the net value of landings (once the landing fee is
deduced) (Astorkiza et al. 1998; Prellezo and Iriondo 2016).
Case 3: shared remuneration system (proportional to revenues minus operational costs)
The share rate and the operating costs (or variable costs) that are deducted from the
value of landings before sharing can vary between fishing fleets, fisheries, countries,
and even vessels. For example, in the Netherlands, in general, fuel cost, which is the
main operating cost, is deducted from the value of landings (Bartelings et al. 2015); while
in France and Spain usually fuel, ice, food, and bait costs are deduced (Lleonart et
al. 1999, 2003; Maynou et al. 2006; Macher et al. 2008). Some examples of fisheries
using shared remuneration systems proportional to revenues minus operational
costs are:
 The remuneration system in Moroccan fisheries is mainly based on shared
remuneration for artisanal fishing and coastal fisheries (i.e., seiners, trawlers,
longliners); while the high seas fleet remunerates their crew mainly with monthly
wages, but includes a supplement based on a small percentage of the catch (Kamili,
personal communication). The purse-seine fishery remunerates their crew with a
60% share of the revenues minus operational costs, but crew also receive a 1–2% of
the landings (called fakira) (Kamili 2006); while in the artisanal fleet in the Nador
Lagoon the share rate is 50% (Malouli Idrissi et al. 2003);
 In Tunisia crew are paid with a share of the revenues once operational costs are
subtracted (Azabou et al. 1989);
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 Almost all commercial fisheries in the US remunerate their crew with a share of
the revenues minus certain costs (McConnell and Price 2006). Indeed, crew in the
Bering Sea/Aleutian Island crab fisheries are remunerated with a share of the revenues
minus certain costs. The costs items subtracted to the revenues, as well as the share
rate (on average is around 40%, but varies between 30 and 50%) depends on the vessel
(Abbott et al. 2010);
 33% of the trawl vessels in Turkey remunerate their crew with this remuneration
system (Ünal 2002);
 Some small-scale purse seiners in Vietnam use a share remuneration of the reve-
nues minus the variable costs (Thuy et al. 2013);
 The trawl fisheries in the Spanish Mediterranean remunerate their crew with a
share (often 50%) of the revenues minus operational costs (case 3), but crew also
receive a small part of the landings (morralla, composed of low valued species)
(case 2) (Lleonart et al. 1999, 2003; Maynou et al. 2006);
 In France, the most common remuneration system is based on a share of the
revenue minus the operational costs (landings costs, fuel costs, bait costs, food
costs and ice costs), as modeled in Macher et al. (2008) for the nephrops fishery
in the Bay of Biscay.
Case 4: shared remuneration system (proportional to profits)
In this remuneration system, crew members are paid with a proportion of the profits.
In this case, all costs are deduced to the revenues before sharing it with the crew. This
is mostly a hypothetical model that allows us to cover all possible ranges, as it seldom
occurs in reality.
 It could be the case in very artisanal fisheries where there is scarcity of labor and
the possibility of obtaining production means cheaply (low capital investment), as in
an artisanal fleet in the Canary Islands (Spain) using 5 m long vessels when there is
no share to remunerate capital (Pascual Fernandez 1999).
 Theoretically, it could also be the case in cooperatives where all fishermen are
owners of the production means.
 Theoretically, this could also be the case on small boats when there is only one
crew, who is also the owner of the vessel. In this case, the distinction between
remuneration of labor and remuneration of the invested capital is not systematic
(Boncoeur et al. 2000).4
The bioeconomic model
In order to explore the sensitivity of existing remuneration systems to different man-
agement targets and so different economic performances, we analyzed the global mar-
ine fisheries as represented in the Sunken Billions (Willmann et al. 2008), using a
Gordon-Schaefer bio-economic model (Gordon 1953, 1954; Schaefer 1954, 1957).
Basic population dynamics are used to illustrate how fisheries work and provide the
basis for understanding issues such as optimal harvesting rates, predation and habitat
destruction. Population dynamics describe the ways in which a given population grows
and shrinks over time, due to by birth, death, and migration. Fish stock growth
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(change) depends on recruitment, natural mortality, individual growth and harvesting.
This may be summarized as follows:
Stock growth ¼ Recruitment þ Individual growth ‐ Natural mortality ‐ Harvest:
A typical model of population growth is based on the logistic equation, where the rate
of growth is proportional to both the existing population and the amount of available re-
sources, all else being equal (Verhulst 1838; Clark 1976). So, the growth of a fish stock
can be expressed in the continuous version of the logistic model described by the differen-
tial equation used in the Verhulst/Pearl surplus production model (Schaefer 1970):
F xtð Þ ¼ rXt 1−XtK
 
ð1Þ
Where Xt is the biomass level of the stock or stock size (weight of the stock) at time
t, F(Xt) represents the change in stock per unit of time dX(t)/dt, the constant r is the
Malthusian parameter that refers to the rate of maximum population growth and K
is the carrying capacity. In the equation, the unimpeded growth rate is modeled by
the first term + rX. The value of the rate r represents the proportional increase of the
population X in one unit of time. As the population grows, the second term, which
is − rX2/K, becomes larger than the first as some members of the population N inter-
fere with each other by competing for some critical resource, such as food or living
space. This antagonistic effect is called the bottleneck, and is modeled by the value of
the parameter K. Competition diminishes the combined growth rate, until the value
of X ceases to grow.
This implies that stock growth follows a parabolic growth curve. By defining B1 as k
and B2 as (k/r), then eq. 1 could be rewritten as: F(xt) = B1Xt – B2Xt
2. The natural equi-
librium (maximum stock size) is reached when the stock of fish is equal to the environ-
mental carrying capacity, X = K. That is why K is termed as the maximum value that X
can reach. To obtain the maximum natural growth in equilibrium and the correspond-
ing stock size, the first order derivative of eq. 1 should equal to zero:
dX
dt
¼ r 1−2Xt
K
 
¼ 0 ð2Þ
From this, it is obtained that the stock size where maximum growth of the fish stock
occurs is at K2 .
It is assumed that the short-run harvest function follows the common Schaefer
harvest function (Schaefer 1957), where the catch or harvest is proportional to the
fishing effort and the stock level:
H ¼ qEX ð3Þ
Where H is the harvest, q is the catchability coefficient and E is the fishing effort.
The catchability coefficient (q) expresses how effective the fishing effort is in relation to
the stock level by a given fishing fleet.
The fishing effort, or sometimes just called effort, is a measure of the amount of fish-
ing. Frequently some surrogate is used relating to a given combination of inputs into
the fishing activity, such as the number of vessels, number of hours or days spent fish-
ing, numbers of hooks used, kilometers of nets used, etc. (OECD 1998). Fishing effort
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adjustments simulated in this study correspond to capacity adjustments (changes in the
number of vessels). Vessels in the fishery are assumed to be similar (homogeneous),
and consequently have the same harvesting power and cost structure. In addition, fish-
ing days by vessel and crew size per vessel are assumed to be constant.
If it is assumed that harvest (fishing) is done on a sustainable way, then the stock
biomass that is removed by fishing has to be equal to the stock growth. Then the long-
term harvest function is:
H ¼ F Xð Þ ¼ rX 1−X
K
 
ð4Þ
Considering eq. 3, harvest can be rewritten as:
F Xð Þ ¼ rX 1−X
K
 
−qEX ð5Þ
Then, the stock at equilibrium under a sustainable exploitation is equal to:
X ¼ K
r
r−qEð Þ ð6Þ
While the sustainable harvest level is determined by:
H ¼ qE K
r
r−qEð Þ ð7Þ
The gross revenue of a fishery is equivalent to the value of landings, and so equals
quantity harvested multiplied by the price of fish (value of landings, VL). In the global
fisheries model employed in the Sunken billions (Willmann et al. 2008), the average
price of landings is a function of the global marine commercial biomass. The model
uses a value of 0.2 for the elasticity of demand with respect to biomass, which means
that if the biomass doubles, then the landings price increases by 20%.
VL ¼ p H ð8Þ
P ¼ 0:92þ 0:2Xe−Xsq
Xsq
ð9Þ
Then the value of landings curve will have the same shape as the sustainable harvest
or yield curve, scaled up or down depending on the price. Following the Gordon-
Schaefer bio-economic surplus production model (Gordon 1953, 1954), the value of
landings’ function is expressed in terms of effort (developing eq. 8 in terms of eq. 7).
In our application, it is assumed a constant marginal cost of effort for simplicity.
This is based on the homogenous vessels assumption, where the vessels are added to
(or taken out of ) the fishery at the same cost as the previous one. The cost function
is proportional (linear) to effort at a constant cost, a, per unit of effort. In Fig. 1 the
total cost line (TC), is shown as an upward-sloping straight line. This corresponds to
the traditional model where wages are assumed fixed, and consequently they are
proportional to effort.
TC ¼ a E ð10Þ
Net profits, or vessel owner rents, can therefore be estimated from the difference
between the revenues generated (value of landings) and the total costs.
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NP ¼ VL – TC ð11Þ
Fisheries rent is often considered as a “surplus” profit over and above that considered
normal. In traditional models, the total fishery rent is equal to the profits and so the
vessel’s owner rent. The labor market is assumed to be in equilibrium, and conse-
quently crew is remunerated with a fixed wage equal to the opportunity cost of labor.
From previous Fig. 1, different reference points (management targets) can be delim-
ited. The Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) corresponds to the maximum harvest
sustainable over time that can be obtained from a fish stock (point A in Fig. 1), which
equals to the maximum growth of the fish stock. Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) is
the sustainable harvest level that maximizes rents (equal to profits in this case), and so
it corresponds to the effort level where there is the maximum distance between the rev-
enue curve and the total costs line (point B in Fig. 1). The bio-economic equilibrium
occurs when profits are 0 at equilibrium, and so at the harvest and effort levels when
revenues are equal to the costs (point C in Fig. 1). Theoretically, bioeconomic equilib-
rium takes place at open access, which is the condition where access to the fishery (for
the purpose of harvesting fish) is unrestricted; i.e., the right to catch fish is free and
open to all (OECD 2012).
However, when shared remuneration systems are taken into account, costs continue
to be considered proportional to the number of vessels in the fleet (i.e., to the effort),
except for labor costs that will depend on the revenues and the extent of costs deduced
in each shared remuneration system. Therefore, total costs are disaggregated into labor
costs (assumed to be 40%, following Willmann et al. (2008)) and other costs that are
proportional to fishing effort (60%).
Wages from all remuneration systems are assumed to be equal at the current fishing
effort level. The share rates of the different remuneration systems are identified so that
labor costs at the current effort level are the same.
Fig. 1 Value of landings, costs and profits evolution depending on fishing effort level and management targets
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Analyzing these 4 remuneration systems allow us to model the most common remu-
neration systems used in fisheries:
 Case 1: Fixed remuneration system: in a fixed remuneration system, wages are
constant. Labor costs or crew costs (LC) are equal to the total crew gross
remuneration, and are obtained multiplying the average fixed wage (wage1) by the
total crew number (crew).

LC1 ¼ wage1  crew ð12Þ
 Case 2: Shared remuneration system (proportional to revenues/catch): in such
remuneration systems, wages are proportional to the value of landings (i.e., catch).

LC2 ¼ share rate2⋅VL ð13Þ
 Case 3: Shared remuneration system (proportional to revenues minus operational
costs): In this system, crew members obtain a share of the difference between the
total value of landings and the variable (operating) costs (VC). Then crew costs are
obtained as:

LC3 ¼ share rate3⋅ VL−VCð Þ ð14Þ
 Case 4: Shared remuneration system (proportional to profits): In this shared
remuneration system, crew members obtain a share of the profits and hence, crew
costs are calculated as:

LC4 ¼ share rate4⋅NP ð15Þ
When we refer to wages in this study, we refer to gross wages (i.e., including social
security). This is because net wages would depend on each country’s regulations (i.e.
taxes), while gross wages are only influenced by the fishing activity. Average gross wage
is proportional to the labor costs per unit of effort. The average crew wage at any effort
level (e) and for each remuneration system (w) is equal to the total crew remuneration
(labor costs, LC) divided by the crew number (crew) (see eq. 16). Crew number is un-
known, but it is known to be proportional to effort (eq. 17). Therefore, by combining
eqs. 16 and 17, crew wage can be expressed as a function of the labor costs per unit of
effort (eq. 18). Hence, crew wages for any remuneration system at any effort level
as a function of the current (status quo) wage, which is equal to the fixed wage,
can be estimated as a function of labor costs and effort at status quo and at the
effort level (eq. 19).
wageew ¼ LCewcrew ð16Þ
crew ¼ cE ð17Þ
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wageew ¼ LCewcEe ð18Þ
wageew
wagesq
¼ LCewEsq
EeLCsq
ð19Þ
Since crew wages can increase over the fixed wage in shared remunerations systems
(assumed to be equal to the opportunity cost of labor), then labor rent can be created.
Labor rent (or crew surplus): is estimated from the difference between crew wages and
the opportunity cost of labor:
LR ¼ wageew−ocl ð20Þ
LR ¼ wageew−wageOA ð21Þ
where ocl is the opportunity cost of labor.
Data
Biologic and economic parameters are estimated from the global marine fisheries
model used in the Sunken billions report (Willmann et al. 2008).
Table 2 reports the biological parameters necessary to estimate the logistic function
represented in eqs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.
Table 3 reports the economic parameters price and cost per unit of fishing effort (E
costs) necessary to estimate eqs. 8, 9, 10 and 11. The average landings price depends
on the global marine commercial biomass. The model uses a value of 0.2 for the elasti-
city of demand with respect to biomass (Willmann et al. 2008), which means that if the
global biomass doubles, then the landings price increases by 20%.
Results
Figure 2 summarizes the results obtained in the analysis using the parameters in
Tables 2 and 3. A table with all the values is provided in the Appendix.
From Fig. 2 (and Table in the Appendix) it can be observed that the costs trajectories
from the different remuneration systems 1, 2 and 3 meet at the current fishing effort
level (relative fishing effort level of 1, as can be seen in Table 4), as assumed in the
model. While the cost trajectory from remuneration system 4 follows the revenues
curve, because it is assumed that there are no profits but all remaining revenues are
split between the crew members.
The maximum difference between the costs trajectories from the different remuner-
ation systems and the revenue curve (which equals to the maximum profits point) hap-
pens at different effort levels, depending on the remuneration system. While the
maximum rents (equal to the gross value added) takes place at the same fishing effort
level (relative fishing effort level of 0.45), the same for the maximum revenue (relative
Table 2 Biological parameters
Variable Value
K 72.32
r 5.26
q 3.45
Source: own estimations from Sunken Billions report (Willmann et al. 2008)
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effort level of 0.66), and the maximum harvest (MSY) (relative effort level of 0.76), that
take place at the same fishing effort level independently of the remuneration system.
The maximum revenue and the maximum production (MSY) do not take place at
the same effort level because price increases when the available biomass increases,
and consequently when landings decrease. It should be noted that the cost curve
in case 4 follows the revenues curve, as it assumes that all profits are split between
the crew members.
Thus, Table 4 reports the different relative fishing effort levels at which the different
management objectives take place for each remuneration system.
At each management objective, and consequently at its corresponding fishing effort
level, different fisheries rents can be obtained. Fisheries rents start from zero when
there is no fishing and increase as fishing activity increases up to the MEY level, subse-
quently decreasing until bioeconomic equilibrium is reached, and rents are again zero
(See Table 5).
Fisheries rent are composed of profits (owner rents) and labor rents. Because crew
wages increase under shared remuneration systems, crew can capture part of the fisher-
ies rent. The amount of fisheries rent captured by the crew will depend on the remu-
neration system. Table 6 shows the distribution of fisheries rent between owner and
crew at each management objective under the different remuneration systems.
By definition, at the bioeconomic equilibrium level no profits are generated, but labor
can still obtain some rents (depending on the opportunity cost of labor assumption).
Under a shared remuneration proportional to revenues labor rent would be 4.02 billion
dollars, while under a shared remuneration proportional to revenues minus operational
Table 3 Economic parameters
Variable Value
Price 0:92þ 0:2 Xe−XsqXsq
E costs 83.8
Source: Sunken Billions report (Willmann et al. 2008)
Fig. 2 Revenues, costs and profits evolution depending on remuneration system and fishing effort
level (billion USD)
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costs labor rent would be $10.72 billion. At MEY, profits under fixed remuneration
systems are $50.34 billion, while labor rent is null; under a shared remuneration
proportional to revenues, profits are $28 billion and labor rent $22.34 billion; under a
shared remuneration proportional to revenues minus operational costs, profits are
$14.75 billion and labor rent $35.59 billion; and under a shared remuneration propor-
tional (equal) to profits, profits are null and labor rent $50.34 billion.
Table 7 reports the average crew wages as a function of current wage (equal to fixed
wage) per remuneration system and management objective.
Table 7 shows that average crew wages can increase under shared remuneration sys-
tems when more restrictive management objectives are achieved (i.e., MSY, MEY), and
consequently when fish stocks improve. Thus, when fishing at MSY, wages are a 59, 94
and 93% higher than current level under shared remuneration proportional to revenues,
revenues minus operational costs and profits, respectively. Similarly, at MEY average
wages are a 148, 236 and 232% higher than current level under shared remuneration
proportional to revenues, revenues minus operational costs and profits, respectively.
Average wages increase when fishing effort decreases, and so when stock size (biomass
at sea) increases. Consequently, maximum average wages occur at the lowest fishing effort
level above zero. Thus, attempting to maximize average crew wages is an unrealistic
management objective if not defined for a certain crew number and time period.
Discussion
Shared remuneration systems have traditionally proven, and continue to prove, useful
in fisheries because they provide an incentive to crew when their work is sometimes
difficult to monitor. This way, rents and risks are shared between the vessel owner and
the crew; the vessel owner does not have to dole out remuneration at fixed levels if
catches are low (Acheson 1981; McGoodwin 1991). However, when the economic per-
formance of a fleet increases, crew wages increase significantly and when this happens,
the crew are able to capture some of the fishery rents (extraordinary profits).
Table 4 Effort level for each management objective and remuneration system
Costs case 1 Costs case 2 Costs case 3 Costs case 4
Max rents (MEY) A 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
Max profits B 0.45 0.45 0.43 -
Max revenues C 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
MSY D 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76
Open access E 0.97 0.95 0.91 -
Current F 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 5 Total rent evolution (billion USD)
Costs case 1 Costs case 2 Costs case 3 Costs case 4
MEY 50.34 50.34 50.34 50.34
Max profits 50.34 50.34 50.21 -
Max revenues 41.68 41.68 41.68 41.68
MSY 31.72 31.72 31.72 31.72
Current −4.95 −4.95 −4.95 −4.95
Open access 0.00 4.02 10.72 -
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In this paper, we compared the fixed remuneration system with three different shared
remuneration systems commonly used in fisheries: (1) proportional to revenues, (2)
proportional to revenues minus operational costs and (3) proportional to profits. By
investigating these three shared remuneration systems with a simple bioeconomic
model, we were able to analyze the entire spectrum of shared remuneration systems.
The shared remuneration proportional to revenues minus operational costs (case 3)
may be the most standard remuneration system in fisheries; while the shared remuner-
ation proportional to revenues (case 2) represents the extreme case where no costs are
deducted from revenues and the shared remuneration proportional to profits (case 4)
represents the extreme case where all costs are deducted. So, any particular shared re-
muneration system can be represented, depending on the number of costs items that
are deducted from revenues; e.g., if less costs items are deducted than in case 3, then
the remuneration system will behave somewhere in the middle between cases 2 and 3.
Results confirm, as shown in the Sunken Billions report (Willmann et al. 2008), that
global marine fisheries are underperforming of about $50 billion per year,5 and society
could capture a substantial part of them by improving fisheries management (e.g., by
fishing at maximum rents or MSY points). However, these $50 billion per year could
not be directly translated into profits, because crew members can capture part of the
fisheries rent in shared remuneration systems once the economic performance im-
proves. For example, if global fisheries would be managed at MSY, it could be obtained
about $32 billion per year ($50 billion per year when maximizing rents). If labor would
be remunerated with fixed salaries, then these $32 billion per year would become part
of the profits (capital rent); instead if crew are remunerated with shared remuneration
systems 2, 3 and 4, then profits would not be $32 billion per year but $17 billion, $8
billion and $0 billion per year, respectively. The rest of the fisheries rents become part
of the labor rents.
Similar results were obtained for the Bay of Biscay nephrops fishery where crew
members receive a shared salary as in case 3. Guillen et al. (2015) estimated that if
Table 6 Profit and labour rent evolution (billion USD)
Costs case 1 Costs case 2 Costs case 3 Costs case 4
MEY 50.34; 0.00 28.00; 22.34 14.75; 35.59 0.00; 50.34
Max profits 50.34; 0.00 28.00; 22.34 14.78; 35.43 0.00; −
Max revenues 41.68; 0.00 22.57; 19.11 11.25; 30.43 0.00; 41.68
MSY 31.72; 0.00 16.64; 15.08 7.70; 24.02 0.00; 31.72
Current −4.95; 0.00 −4.95; 0.00 −4.95; 0.00 0.00; −4.95
Open access 0.00; 0.00 0.00; 4.02 0.00; 10.72 0.00; −
Table 7 Crew wages as a function of current wage (equal to fixed wage)
Costs case 1 Costs case 2 Costs case 3 Costs case 4
MEY 1.00 2.48 3.36 3.32
Max profits 1.00 2.48 3.46 -
Max revenues 1.00 1.86 2.38 2.38
MSY 1.00 1.59 1.94 1.93
Current 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.85
Open access 1.00 1.12 1.34 -
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the nephrops fishery recovers to MSY, salaries would increase by 95% and by 320%
if it reaches MEY; while for global marine fisheries, wages would increase by 94
and 236%, respectively.
In shared remuneration systems, labor costs are independent of the crew number,
and consequently the average wage depends on the crew number. While in fixed remu-
neration systems, the average wage is fixed (constant), and so labor costs are propor-
tional to the crew number.
Our results also confirm that the fishing effort required to achieve certain management
objectives may be affected by the crew costs, and consequently by the remuneration sys-
tem in place. Because under shared remuneration systems costs are not proportional to
fishing effort, the effort level required to achieve some economic based management obje-
tives (e.g., maximum profits and maximum employment) vary depending on the remuner-
ation systems. While, the effort level required to achieve other management objectives
(e.g., MSY and maximum rents) is independent of the remuneration system.
When looking at the bioeconomic equilibrium (open-access point) in Fig. 1, the fixed
remuneration is less conservative than the shared remunerations. In other words, the
bioeconomic equilibrium is reached at a higher fishing effort level for the fixed remuner-
ation. However, in Guillen et al., (2015), fixed remuneration was found to be more conser-
vative, mainly as a result of the initial value given to the opportunity cost of labor:
 When the fishery is in bioeconomic equilibrium (no profit or losses) and so the
opportunity cost of labor is assumed to be equal to the bioeconomic equilibrium
salary, then the open access level is the same for all remuneration systems.
 When the fishery is having profits and the opportunity cost of labor is assumed to
be higher than the bioeconomic equilibrium salary, then the fixed remuneration is
less conservative.
 When the fishery is having losses and the opportunity cost of labor is assumed to
be lower than the bioeconomic equilibrium salary, then the fixed remuneration is
more conservative.
Similarly, maximum profits are achieved at different fishing effort levels. When it
is assumed that the fisheries follow a logistic model, the fixed salaries are the less
conservative. Instead, then a different behavior of the fishery is assumed, as in
Guillen et al., (2015), where a hockey stick model is used, then the fixed salaries
were more conservative.
In addition, since in most common shared remuneration systems (case 2 and 3) the
fishing effort that maximizes profits is different than the one that maximizes labor
rents; consequently, there is a principal-agent problem if vessel owners are not present
in the fishing vessels (Eisenhardt 1989; Vestergaard 2010). When a vessel owner is not
present, crew would prefer to increase their fishing effort, if they do not have to bear
the operational costs, in order to increase their revenues. However, in the global per-
spective, taking into account the shared remuneration systems analyzed, when vessel
owners are not present, crew would prefer to reduce overall fishing effort in order to
maximize their rents. Moreover, in shared remuneration systems where only the vessel
owner bears the capital and investment costs (cases 2 and 3), Hannesson (2007) showed
that it could lead to non-optimal (i.e., lower) levels of investment. Indeed, in many
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fisheries, vessel owners pay all investment costs, but the crew receives part of the in-
creases in catch that result (Alexander 1973).
The share rate and the costs items that are deducted to the value of landings may
change between countries, fleets, fisheries and vessels, as well as over time. For example,
in the Netherlands, mainly fuel cost is deduced to the value of landings (Bartelings et al.
2015); while in France and Spain fuel, ice, food, and bait costs are commonly deduced
(Lleonart et al. 1999, 2003; Maynou et al. 2006; Macher et al. 2008). Same happens for
quota costs; in Iceland and Australia quota costs are often borne entirely by the vessel
owner while in the UK quota costs are shared between the owner and the crew, along
with other variable operating costs (Hatcher 2010). Moreover, sometimes costs items
deducted from revenues and share rates may vary between vessels in the same fleet. In-
deed, in the Bering Sea/Aleutian Island crab fisheries, about 80% of the vessels share
quota costs with the crew, while about 20% do not (see Abbott et al. 2010 for more exam-
ples for that particular US fishery).
The analysis assumes a fixed share rate of the crew part. But the share rate can
change if there are significant changes in the fishing conditions: (i) important new
investments (e.g., electronic equipment, introduction of steam-driven fishing vessels in
the Basque Country in Spain led to decrease the crew share to 30% - Pascual Fernandez
1999), (ii) significant variations in fuel prices (Matthiasson 1997), (iii) changes in man-
agement (i.e., introduction of ITQs (Squires et al. 1995; Guyader and Thebaud 2001)).
Thus, the share remuneration systems have proven to be a self-adaptive and time-
consistent remuneration system that can adapt to changing circumstances (Hämäläinen
et al. 1990; McConnell and Price 2006).
So, the share rate could be adjusted either by vessel owners to capture a larger part
of the rents or to keep the crew during the bad years. It could be thus possible that
once a stock starts recovering, vessel owners change the share rate to increase the ves-
sel owner share (and consequently decrease the crew share), in order to capture more
rent once crew wages start to increase. If the share rate could be continually revised to
reflect equilibrium in the labor market, the crew would always get the opportunity cost
of their labor (Hannesson 2007), and consequently results would be similar to the ones
obtained assuming constant wages. This way, the share system would still serve the
purpose of an incentive contract to ensure that crew members exert the necessary
effort to obtain a wage equal to their opportunity wage (Hannesson 2007). While the
vessels owners would capture all the rents (i.e. accumulate all the capital).
However, there are also cases where the share rate has not been revised despite sig-
nificant changes in a fishery. For example, with the implementation of catch shares in
the Bering Sea/Aleutian Island crab fisheries, the share rate has remained practically
unchanged leading to substantial increases in the remuneration for many crew mem-
bers (Abbott et al. 2010). Therefore, whether a remuneration system in a fishery be-
haves as fixed or shared, and consequently the possibility for the crew to capture part
of the vessel owners rent, depends in part on the fixity of the share rate, and so on the
negotiation capacity of each of the parts.
However, in recent years, an increase in the use of the fixed remuneration systems
worldwide has been observed (Thuy et al. 2013; Ünal personal communication). This is
mainly a result of lower and more uncertain catches and revenues, as stocks are be-
coming more overexploited. Increased stock overexploitation and overcapacity (fishing
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effort level increases, i.e., moving rightwards in Fig. 1) lead to lower wages and so more
difficulties to find crew when wages are below the opportunity cost of labor. In that case,
crew would switch jobs to their best alternative job possible. In this sense, Willmann et al.
(2008) reported that more than 75% of the fish stocks were underperforming in economic
terms in 2004, leading to $5 billion losses (without accounting for the potential of
global fisheries). Accordingly, FAO (2014a) reports that the number of stocks
fished at unsustainable biologic levels peaked at 32.5% in 2008, since then declined
slightly to 28.8% in 2011.
The current low salaries6 in the fishing sector also explain the increasing use of for-
eign and unskilled crew in many fisheries worldwide. Foreign crew is often more risk
averse as fishing is often the sole source of income, and so would prefer fix wages
(Nguyen and Leung 2009). In addition, due to the low wages it is difficult to find skilled
labor, and so is replaced with unskilled labor. In these circumstances, vessel owners are
also not willing to pay more for unskilled labor; while the availability of unemployed
unskilled labor also works as an incentive for crew to work hard. Thus, the increase of
fish stocks being overfished worldwide (Worm et al. 2009; FAO 2014a), the increasing
use of foreign manpower and the industrialization of fishing fleets may reduce the use
of shared remuneration systems.
Shared remuneration systems have a general functioning more similar to conven-
tional remuneration systems where workers are paid a piece rate (an amount of money
that relates to their output), rather than the time they input (i.e., fixed remuneration
systems). In addition, in shared remuneration systems the crew share is often divided
between the crew in a non-homogenous way where crew receive different wages based
on their ranks or grades. Hence, wages reflect differences in marginal productivity in-
side the crew. In some fisheries, crew members may receive higher wages on the basis
of age and experience (Breton 1973); while, in other cases all crew equally receive the
same amount, regardless of experience (Lofgren 1972; Colloca et al. 2003). In some
fisheries, mostly artisanal ones, if a crew member owns the fishing gear, he/she
may obtain a larger part of the share (McCall Howard 2012). When fishing success
depends on highly skilled specialists, these specialists may receive a higher percent-
age of the catch (Prins 1965; Wadel 1972). For example, in the Moroccan purse-
seine fishery, the captain receives on average 4.5 times the wage of normal fishermen
(deckhand), the mechanic 2.37 times, the person in charge to mend the nets 2
times, and the cook 1.25 times the wage of a deckhand (see Kamili (2006) for a
more detailed explanation). Purse-seiners in Greece remunerate the captain and
the mechanic with 2.5 times the wage of deckhand each, and crew knowing how
to mend nets and on the stern receive 1.5 times more. While in Brazil, on an 18-
tonne vessel, the captain receives on average 4.5 times, the mechanic 2.5 times, and
the cook 1.5 times the wage of deckhand (Giasson 1981). So, the division of the crew
share among the crew members behaves as a tournament contract where crew members
are rewarded by their rank in the organization (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Green and
Stockey 1983).
Conclusions
If a more rational fisheries management is in place and stocks recover, this may
not be fully translated in an increase in the profitability of the fishing sector. In
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fact, in most fisheries worldwide, crew members are remunerated through different
shared remuneration systems rather than a fixed wage. In shared remuneration sys-
tems, crew wages can be significantly higher than fixed wages (i.e., more than
double) when the stocks and consequently the economic performance of vessels
improve. This leads the crew to capture part of the fisheries rents as crew rents.
These particular remuneration systems suit the needs of the fishing sector by pro-
viding incentives to the workers, which probably has been the historical reason for
its wide adoption and maintenance.
However, the use of the shared remuneration systems worldwide appears to have de-
creased in recent years because of lower and more uncertain catches and revenues due
to overfished fish stocks (Worm et al. 2009; FAO 2014a), the industrialization of fishing
fleets (Thuy et al. 2013; Ünal personal communication), increases in fuel prices that
lower the economic performance, and the difficulties to find and attract crew.
Hence, it is important to understand the particularities and variety of the shared re-
muneration systems in the fishing sector and the implications the remuneration sys-
tems have on crew wages, the firm’s economic performance and the optimal fishing
effort level.
Endnotes
1When assuming prices to be constant in relation to quantity landed and size of the
individuals landed
2It is also an extended practice worldwide that the crew receives a small fraction
of the catch. Depending on the country and fishery, this fraction of the catch could
be a part of the main species or based on low value species or small size and dam-
aged individuals. It is called “morralla” in Spain (Alemany and Álvarez 2003;
Reglero and Morales-Nin 2008; Samy-Kamal et al. 2014) and Cuba (Baisre 2000),
“godaille” in France (Jorion 1979; Del Sol et al. 1998), French Guyana (Guéguen
2001) and Martinique (Failler 1996), and “fakira” in Morocco (Baddyr and Guénette
2002; Kamili 2006).
3From ILO (2004) it seems that to the proportion of the catch sale could be also
deducted operational costs.
4The distinction between remuneration of labour and remuneration of the invested
capital is not systematic for many units, especially for those in which the owner is also
the fisher onboard (Boncoeur et al. 2000) which is the case for most small scale fleets
in Europe (Guyader et al. 2013) and worldwide (Thuy et al. 2013).
5As pointed out by Willmann et al. (2008), losses to the global economy from unsus-
tainable exploitation of living marine resources substantially exceed these estimates.
These estimates exclude losses related to recreational fisheries, marine tourism and il-
legal fishing, as well as the economic contribution of dependent activities such as fish
processing, distribution, and consumption. It also excludes the value of biodiversity
losses, pollution and greenhouse gas emissions.
6In some countries, wages in the fisheries sector have been below the minimum legal
salary during some months. It should be also taken into account the wages by hour at
sea, considering the long time spent onboard together with the harsh and risky working
conditions, instead of absolute wages per year.
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